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Abstract:
The utility of Web-based email clients is clear: a user is able to access their email
account from any computer anywhere at any time. However, this option is unavailable to
users whose security depends on their key pair being stored either on their local computer
or in their browser. Our implementation seeks to solve two problems with secure email
services. The first that of mobility: users must have access to their key pairs in order to
perform the necessary cryptographic operations. The second is one of transition: initially,
users would not want to give up their regular email clients. Keeping these two restrictions
in mind, we decided on the implementation of a secure gateway system that works in
conjunction with an existing mail server and client. Our result is PKIGate, an S/MIME
gateway that uses the DigitalNet (formerly Getronics) S/MIME Freeware Library and
IBM’s 4758 secure coprocessor. This thesis presents motivations for the project, a
comparison with similar existing products, software and hardware selection, the design,
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Currently, a person using an email program that allows them a degree of mobility must
choose between convenience and security. The utility and convenience of Web-based
mailers is clear: they give a user the ability to operate her email account from any
Internet-connected computer at any time. However, if a user is tied to security that
depends upon her key pair being stored either on her local computer or in her browser,
she loses the ability to send or receive secure mail while mobile. Our solution for making
public-key cryptography work for mobile email is the use of a secondary trusted server
that stores and manages the user’s key pair and performs all operations associated with
user authentication, encryption and decryption of text, and the addition and verification of
digital signatures. PKIGate fills the role of the trusted server, providing a set of S/MIME
and secure cryptographic services while still allowing the user to retain the use of her
preferred client.
1.2 Organization
This thesis is organized into six sections. The first section introduces the problem, its
motivations, and the interesting case of email at Dartmouth. Section 2 provides
information on the MIME and S/MIME standards, compares existing technologies with
the design for ours, and explains the technical concepts and technologies we plan to use.
The third section discusses the thought process that went into selecting software and
hardware for the project as well as describing the software we used in our final design.
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Section 4 lays out the hi- and lo-level design for the entire PKIGate mail system. Use
case scenarios for the design from Section 4 are diagramed and detailed in Section 5. We
conclude in Section 6 with a discussion of implementation difficulties, suggestions for
future work, and an evaluation of our solution and the project as a whole.
1.3 Motivation
Since public key cryptography requires no prior contact between sending and receiving
parties, as long as the recipient’s public key information is published, it is an ideal
solution for email. Using other cryptographic standards that depend on the exchange of
an agreed upon key requires the implementation of a number of security protocols, with
each step opening the key to access by an adversary.
The utility of Public Key cryptography in email situations is easy to see. A user is able to
digitally sign email, allowing the recipient to verify the sender. Imagine that the college
application process takes a digital and paranoid turn and admissions offices wish to verify
every letter of recommendation. If a letter writer uses an email program with public key
functionality, he can digitally sign the letter, allowing the admissions office to verify he
sent it, and satisfy their paranoia.
The case for encryption is even easier to make, but we will give a particularly pertinent
example. Medical offices must now meet Condition 3 of HIPAA, the Health Insurance
Portability & Accountability Act, which states that security standards must be put in
place “protecting the confidentiality and integrity of ‘individually identifiable health
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information’”[9]. Assume that a doctor at Dartmouth Health Services needed to contact a
student with confidential health information. In order for the email communication to be
HIPAA compliant, the information must be secured. If there is a certificate server set up
on the Dartmouth campus, the doctor can easily access the student’s public key and send
him an encrypted message without the additional administrative tasks of creating and
sharing an encryption key.
1.4 Email at Dartmouth
The email system at Dartmouth College provides a particularly difficult environment in
which to offer secure mobile email access. Students, faculty, and staff at the college
enjoy the use of Blitzmail, a homegrown email client that allows a user to access his
account from any computer on which the program is installed without altering the
application. Additionally, Dartmouth is home to at least two incarnations of Web-based
mailers, Netblitz and Webblitz. Since a majority of communication on the campus by is
done through email, the campus is home to hundreds of public computers, fondly referred
to as “Blitz terminals,” from which users often check their email.
Obviously in this environment, public key cryptography tied to a user’s computer would
be inconvenient, at the least. If the user’s key needed to be on the machine hosting the
email client, we would have two options: either we would be forced to install the key pair
of every student, faculty and staff member on every computer, including personal
computers, at Dartmouth or we would have to restrict the number of computers a user
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could operate her email account from. At a minimum, the first option would require the
upgrade of the 1,000+ personal computers belonging to the incoming freshmen every
year. However, Webblitz and Netblitz give students the ability to check email from
anywhere in the world. Unless the student had a way of transporting her key pair, we
could not guarantee her secure email services away from the campus. Therefore, a
reasonable solution, at least for PKI services at Dartmouth, is to store user’s key pairs on
a secure central server.
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2. Background
Before beginning the discussion of our implementation of PKIGate, it is necessary to
provide some background information. A description of the MIME and S/MIME




MIME, or Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions, is a standard for Internet messages that
ensures that messages from different email systems are exchanged successfully [19].
Messages in MIME format can contain files of varying types, including types defined by
users. The file type is described in a “content-type” header, which the recipient email
program (or browser) uses to determine the application to use in opening the enclosure.
The binary data that makes up the enclosure is transformed into ASCII text via the
base64-encoding scheme.
2.1.2 S/MIME
S/MIME, Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions, is a standard designed to add
authentication and encryption services to MIME formatted email messages [14]. It is
based on the X.509 certificate standard and the ASN.1 syntax. In the standard, digital
signatures and key transport both depend on public key cryptography. Encryption in
S/MIME is a two-stage process referred to as creating a digital envelope. First, a
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symmetric cipher using the content encryption key (CEK) is applied to the message. Next,




Sending an email message in a simple email system involves several steps. First, the user
composes a message in his email client, a program installed on his computer that allows
him to connect to the mail server [4]. The client sends the message to his email server,
where the user’s account information is stored. There, the message recipient’s address is
broken into two parts: the user and domain names (Ex: user@domain) [5]. The sender’s
server forwards the message to the server where domain is located. The domain server
then delivers the message to user’s account. Later, when that user logs on to his email
account, his client will issue a request to have the mail in his account sent to his
computer.
A gateway is not an email server. Rather, as defined by the marketers of the S/MIME
gateway applications we are about to discuss, it serves as a layer between the email server
and the outside world that allows the email client to remain unchanged. Outgoing email is
piped through the gateway, where S/MIME wrapping and cryptography are applied
S/MIME Encryption
1) Create CEK
2) Use CEK in symmetric cipher encryption of message
3) Encrypt CEK with recipient’s public key
4) Send encrypted CEK and message
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before the message reaches the outside world. Incoming mail passes through the gateway
where S/MIME unwrapping and decryption or validation are applied before the message
reaches the mail server.
Figure 2.2: S/MIME Gateway
2.3 Existing S/MIME Gateway Applications
Before creating the design for a new S/MIME gateway, we researched existing products
similar to the technology we intended to develop. This allowed us to see what features
were being offered, how other groups made their designs secure and understandable, and
provided some initial ideas on how our own application should be constructed. Before
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discovered clearly state how a user’s private key or cryptographic operations are made
secure. Our PKIGate is the only one that offers a tamper-proof hardware platform to
protect sensitive operations and information. The following section introduces some of
the major ideas behind the design of our S/MIME gateway-style application, PKIGate, as
it relates to existing products, with the actual design to follow in Section 4.
2.3.1 “Seamless” S/MIME Gateway Applications
I will use the term seamless gateway to refer to an S/MIME application that the user does
not need to know exists. The use cases of these applications are most similar to those
corresponding to our secure level functionality. For example, the ZipLip Email
Gateway and BayCorp MailMarshal are each responsible for all key management tasks
and act irrespective of the client’s S/MIME or cryptographic abilities [22, 1]. The
gateway application itself decides whether an outgoing message should be signed or
encrypted, and automatically decrypts and verifies incoming messages. With S/MIME
Stripper, all outgoing emails are signed. The first time a user sends an email, S/MIME
Stripper generates a private key and an X.509 Certificate [15].
PKIGate is different from the applications above in that it is unclear whether or not the
user has any control over the application’s function. In PKIGate, even a user at the
secure level has the option of setting account or recipient preferences via the Security
Manager (A full discussion of this follows in Section 5).
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2.3.2 User controlled S/MIME Gateways
User controlled refers to the ability of the user to affect the way in which the gateway
operates. The IAIK S/MIME Mapper is an example and signs and encrypts email
messages based on user-specified preferences that the user has defined [20]. For
decryption, the email client requests messages from the mail-server, at which point
S/MIME Mapper connects to the server, receives the messages, decrypts those that were
encrypted, and verifies signatures. The application generates and attaches a message
containing information about authentication or encryption schemes and the validity of the
signature, if there was one to verify, before the message is transferred to the email client.
Much like what is described for S/MIME Mapper, a user at the secure level of PKIGate
can set preferences for the entire account. We add information messages to secure
level user’s messages and display them for paranoid level users in the Security
Manager window, a secure client connected to the application.
2.3.3 Mixed-mode S/MIME Gateways
Applications that fall into this category are closest to our design for PKIGate because
they allow the user to select the level of security at which he/she wishes to operate his/her
account with the gateway. The CryptoEx Selflearning Gateway for Email Security
supports both normal users and “end-to-end encryption for special users” via scripting
[2]. Emails can be processed according to any set of rules that can be expressed in a script
language, such as those based on the message sender. Key pairs are generated on
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demand, rather than being created in advance by an administrator and manually
maintained.
PKIGate will have three levels of security, to be explained later, that allow the
application to determine what, if anything, should be done to incoming and outgoing
messages. Instead of scripting, however, the user will be allowed to set a series of
preferences. Current plans for PKIGate do not call for the automatic generation of
certificates or key pairs, and instead assume they will come from outside the application
or be managed by someone in an administrative role.
2.4 Secure Coprocessors
A secure coprocessor is a tamper-proof, sealed device with a processor, memory storage,
and, (in some cases) fast cryptography support [21]. It is trusted to protect the
information stored on it and its computations from a set of physical attacks by an
adversary. Any attempt at penetration will result in the erasure of all critical memory.  A
secure coprocessor serves as the trusted server for PKIGate by providing an area in the
system on which to perform sensitive cryptographic operations. For a more in depth
explanation of using a secure coprocessor in a practical security solution, see Smith and
Weingart’s “Using a High-Performance, Programmable Secure Coprocessor” [17].
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3. Software and Hardware Selection
When developing any new application, it is essential that the developer research tools,
libraries, or other existing ideas that can aid in development. Given the timeline for this
project, the growth of S/MIME as an internet standard, and the availability of outside
resources, it seemed prudent to spend time investigating the available resources and
selecting from amongst them to use in the implementation of PKIGate rather than coding
all components from scratch. For fulfilling the requirements of the S/MIME standard,
open source options existed in the form of the pre-written utility, OpenSSL S/MIME, or
as a set of libraries from DigitalNet that provided all the necessary functionality [13, 6].
For MIME formatting, a number of open source options existed. We chose to explore
two: Mpack, a Linux utility, and the S/MIME Freeware MIME library [12, 6]. The design
called for a secure platform on which all cryptographic operations could be performed.
For that, we chose the IBM 4758 secure coprocessor, used in many other PKI Lab
projects. We now discuss the details of these implementation options and their
differences and provide the reasons for the selections we eventually made.
3.1 Choosing an S/MIME Implementation: OpenSSL vs. SFL
3.1.1 The OpenSSL S/MIME Utility
OpenSSL is a software package often associated with creating secure socket layers [13].
However, it also contains a utility for handling S/MIME email processing. The S/MIME
utility operates via the command line and offers encryption, decryption, signing, and
verification of messages. Certificates, which the S/MIME utility uses in performing
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cryptographic operations, are sent to the application as another input parameter. The
utility supports DES, TDES, RC2-40, RC2-64, and RC2-128 (where the number in each
of the RC2 algorithm names refers to the key length) algorithms, through its
cryptographic library, crypto.
3.1.2 The S/MIME Freeware Library
 The DigitalNet Government Solutions (formerly Getronics) S/MIME Freeware Library
(SFL) is a set of libraries that, when used in conjunction, provide cryptographic message
syntax (CMS) wrapping and can interface with any type of underlying cryptography
[6,7]. When used in combination with other DigitalNet libraries, all necessary services
for creating an S/MIME application are provided: the DigitalNet Enhanced SNACC
library provides ASN.1 encoding and decoding and the Certificate Management Library
provides X.509 Certificate Processing. (See Figure 3.1 for the overall architecture).
 
 Cryptographic functionality is provided by loading “instances” of crypto-tokens, in the
form of dynamically linked libraries, which can be thought of as sessions with the
selected Cryptographic Token Interface Library (CTIL) [8]. A user is allowed multiple
active crypto-tokens from which the application selects the instance that provides the
appropriate functionality for decrypting or verifying incoming messages. The user (or
application) may also set a preference for which underlying crypto-token he/she would
like to use in outgoing message operations.
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Figure 1. S/MIME Freeware Library Architecture
(Note: only those pieces from the library essential to our implementation are shown)
3.1.3 Selection of SFL
There were two main factors in the decision to use the S/MIME Freeware Library (SFL)
rather than the OpenSSL S/MIME utility. OpenSSL offered an entire S/MIME
application, which in other cases may have proved the ideal solution. However,
OpenSSL’s S/MIME processing is dependent upon its crypto library. In order to use our
own underlying cryptographic system, the actual classes and code responsible for
processing S/MIME message would have to be separated from the rest of the code base,
and calls to their library replaced with calls to ours. Here, SFL’s modular design was a
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necessary change to the library would be the implementation of a Cryptographic Token
Interface to communicate with our underlying cryptographic operations.
Additionally, OpenSSL is more than just a tool for processing and creating S/MIME
messages. It provides many other services that are not required for the application, and,
given the restrictions placed on the application size by the limited memory space of the
4758, it would have been necessary to remove all unnecessary functionality from
OpenSSL. With SFL, the library provides only the functionality we need, with the option
of plugging in extras, such as Access Control.
3.2 MIME Formatting: Mpack vs. SFL MIME
3.2.1 Mpack
Mpack is a Linux utility operated via the command line [12]. The user inputs a set of
parameters, including the recipient or newsgroup, and the file to be encoded. That file is
encoded in one or more MIME messages, which are then mailed to recipients, posted to a
newsgroup, or written to an output file.
3.2.2 The SFL MIME Library
The SFL MIME library is a set of open source classes included as part of the test code of
the S/MIME Freeware Library [6]. Creating a MIME message consists of instantiating a
MIME object, filling in data using either the constructors or set methods, and then
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allowing the SFL MIME library functions to determine content type and produce the
message’s MIME headers. Once a message object is created, it can be sent to a data
stream and written to a file or to the screen.
3.2.3 Selection of SFL MIME
The first cause for choosing SFL MIME over Mpack for our implementation is similar to
the first reason that made us choose the SFL over OpenSSL. Mpack, like OpenSSL
S/MIME, includes a set of functions not needed by the application we desire to produce;
it would have been necessary to tease out only the pieces of the application we actually
needed.  Additionally, SFL MIME is featured in the test cases for the SFL, not only
proving the two can interact, but also providing examples of how to properly use the
libraries.
3.3 Hardware: The Secure Coprocessor
Using the IBM 4758 secure coprocessor was a nearly obvious choice. It provides us with
a secure place to perform all the necessary cryptographic operations, one of the goals
described for our application in Section 1. The 4758 was successfully tested and loaded
with a Linux kernel, it is possible to run a C++ application inside the card, and it provides
fast hardware support for cryptographic operations [10]. Communication is easily
performed over socket connections between the host and card applications.  However, the
4758 imposed one major restriction, which spawned difficulties to be discussed later.
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The design of PKIGate and its place in an overall email system that follows is one of the
many possibilities that may have worked given the goals of our project. The design
attempts to minimize time and effort costs to users who do not wish to use the new
S/MIME functionality, while still providing those with the desire for privacy the means to
have it. The section begins with a hi-level description of all the components in the system
and follows with design detail for each, where communication between the various parts
is explained.
4.1 Components Overview
PKIGate is designed as an add-on to an existing email system and requires that an email
server and client already be in place. Instead of being located between the mail server and
the outside world like the gateway described in Section 2.2, PKIGate is designed to work
in direct conjunction with the mail server. This helps to eliminate some of the time costs
to users who do not wish to utilize the system in some cases or at all. Because of this, the
normal email server must be reconfigured to communicate over a secure connection with
PKIGate in addition to its connection to the outside world. It is also important to note that
the application is not designed for use by individual users, but is instead intended for use
as part of an institutional mail system with a central mail server and an administrator in
charge of account management.
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Figure 4.1: High-level design of the PKIGate System. Dashed lines represent applications
and connections for which we cannot guarantee security.
PKIGate adds three additional components to the existing system: the PKIGate
application, Crypto Server, and the Security Manager Window client. PKIGate is the
manager of the S/MIME system: it handles requests from the mail server and Security
Manager Window for all accounts. The Security Manager Window is a direct secure
connection to PKIGate. It allows a user to interact with his/her gateway account, set
preferences, update his/her address book, and, in the case of paranoid level users, the























which to securely send and view sensitive messages. Crypto Server accesses the 4758
secure coprocessor’s built-in cryptography hardware support.
4.2 PKIGate
PKIGate performs the actual functionality to meet the S/MIME standard. The Getronics
S/MIME Freeware Library provides S/MIME functionality for the gateway, with
cryptographic operations currently offloaded to Crypto Server, and MIME formatting
supplied through the SFL MIME Library. Additionally, PKIGate manages all system user
accounts. Each user account is kept in an Account object, identified by a unique
identification (UID) number based on some account setting in the original email system.
Eventually, we hope to move PKIGate and the cryptographic functionality onto the same
secure hardware device. (For more on this, see Section 6.1.1). For now, the connection
between PKIGate and the Crypto Server will be private.
4.2.1 Desired Hardware
In the interest of keeping all text and key pairs secure, our design calls for PKIGate to
reside on the 4758 secure coprocessor. Outside applications would communicate with the
application through either a private or SSL connection. (Information on difficulties with
the implementation follows in section 6.1.1).
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4.2.2. Account
An Account Object holds all information pertaining to a user. In an unset account, all
preferences are set to the defaults (minimum security) and the user’s address book is
initially empty. Upon login, the user is able to set a SecurityLevel (secure or
paranoid), preferences for his/her account, and his/her address book. (For more
information on how these preferences affect the application, see the use cases scenarios in
Section 5). An Account keeps a list of key pairs and a pointer to the preferred (or
default) key pair. The first time during a session a user sends or receives a message,
PKIGate checks for an Account object for that user. If there is one, it examines the
user’s preferences to see if any action needs to be taken, and then calls the proper
operation using the selected key pair. Otherwise, the message is left unaltered and the
system sets a variable stating this user does not have an account, making any future calls
to PKIGate during the session unnecessary, and reducing the time costs to user’s without
accounts.











ClientSession represents the user’s normal email client account upon login. When a user
logs in, the list of Account objects is checked by UID. If there is an Account, the
session is marked to check messages with PKIGate. If a user never logs into the Security
Manager, then his/her messages will not enter PKIGate.
4.3 Crypto Server
Crypto Server resides on the 4758 secure coprocessor. It accepts XDR encoded requests
from PKIGate containing an operation identifier and all necessary input for the requested
operation. (More on these requests follow). Following the ideas in Sean Smith’s paper
"Outbound Authentication for Programmable Secure Coprocessors,” the user’s private
key is encrypted with the 4758’s public key [16]. Therefore, the secure Crypto Server is
the only place where the user’s private key exists unencrypted.
4.4 Connection Between PKIGate and Crypto Server
PKIGate and the Crypto Server communicate through encoded request objects over a
private connection (unless their final combined size is such that both applications can be
placed on one secure coprocessor, see Section 6.1.1).
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Figure 4.3: Communication between PKIGate and Crypto Server
Our Libsmcard library implements the Crypto Token Library interface of the SFL and
utilizes the ASN.1 encoding and functionality provided. We added a method,
cardConnect, to send requests to the Crypto Server and receive and parse responses,
and created two C structures for transferring information between components,
crypt_request and crypt_response. Each of the SFL interface cryptographic
functions creates a crypt_request object (see figure 4.4) specifying the operation
and information and input buffers and passes this to cardConnect.















The cardConnect function accepts a crypt_request object and an unallocated
output buffer. The request is XDR encoded, and sent over a private socket to Crypto
Server, where it is parsed. Crypto Server makes the appropriate function call and returns
a crypt_response object containing the length of the output buffer and the buffer
itself.
Figure 4.5: The crypt_response object
4.5 Security Manager Window
The Security Manager window communicates directly with PKIGate via an SSL
connection. For users at the secure level, the Security Manager window is used only
for login and altering account preferences. However, for paranoid level users who are
opening or sending encrypted messages, the Security Manager serves as a second secure
email client. The Security Manager Window will offer a set of options to the paranoid
level user, including setting and altering his/her account preferences. Specifically, it will
provide options for creating encrypted or signed and encrypted messages and also for
viewing received encrypted messages. (For more details on each of the operations, see





Figure 4.6: Possible layout for the Security Manager Window, Paranoid Level User View
Menu









Security Manager Window: Secure Connection to PKIGate
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5. Use Cases
The following use case scenarios are the result of conversations between members of the
PKI Lab and brief user studies I organized and conducted with undergraduates at
Dartmouth. They do not represent the only possible implementation of PKIGate, but
simply one of the many that matched the design and restrictions of the system as
described in the previous section. In this set of use cases, users are organized into three
levels of security, insecure, secure, and paranoid, descriptions of which follow.
The different user levels allow minimal to maximum user interaction with PKIGate via
the secure client, the Security Manager Window.
We now discuss these use cases as they relate to the different user security levels of
PKIGate.
5.1 Launch and Login
Login is necessary for users at either the secure or paranoid levels. Brainstorming
sessions I led earlier this term with a user group led to two suggestions for convenient
ways to launch the two-window secure email system. In each of the below cases, the user
would set his security level as part of account preferences during his first login to the
Security Manager window, and have the option of changing it at any later point in time.
The first two cases below refer to logins for web-based email clients, while the third
refers to the launch of a desktop client.
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The first login scenario requires administration by an entity with knowledge of all email
clients operating with the PKIGate application. The administrator would create a website
with links to each of the supported clients from amongst which the user would select the
link for his email client of choice. The link would open two windows: one with the
original email client login screen and the second with the Security Manager Window
login screen. After logging in to both applications, the user would be signed in to the
system at his set security level.
The second idea is similar to the first, except that instead of a page of links, there would
be a secure link for each of the supported email clients. For example, the secure version
of “Webblitz” would reside at http://secure.basement.dartmouth.edu/~blitz instead of
http://basement.dartmouth.edu/~blitz. At that address, the Security Manager and regular
email client login forms would open in separate browser windows, allowing the user to
log in to both applications.
27
Figure 5.1: PKIGate Secure vs. Insecure Connections. Dashed arrows and boxes
represent applications and connections for which we cannot guarantee security.
Since the Security Manager is a Web-based client, there are no clear shortcuts for desktop
email clients to launch the system without altering the client. Therefore, it would be
necessary for the user to launch a browser window for the Security Manager login screen.
5.2 Insecure
The insecure level denotes a session with the user’s regular email client. In this case,
it seems justified to assume that a user who never has an account created with PKIGate
and who never logs into the Security Manager system should not be subject to the time or
effort costs involved in using the gate. The Security Manager window need not be
opened, nor does the user ever need to log into that part of the system. On the first















the application will notify the server that the user does not have an account and set a
variable to that effect.
5.3 Secure
A secure level user has an account with PKIGate, has registered at least one key pair,
and is comfortable with allowing the application to operate on her email with little to no
interaction. At some point, she has set overall account preferences or preferences in her
account address book for PKIGate to follow in performing S/MIME operations; the
session operates nearly seamlessly once preferences have been set. The secure level
user has the ability to protect her outgoing and incoming messages from possible
interception by adversaries outside her mail system. She is also able to digitally sign and
verify messages, all without changing the client through which she normally sends or
receives messages.
5.3.1 Sign
For signing, the user creates an outgoing message in her regular client. The message
passes to the regular email server, which then contacts PKIGate through an SSL
connection. Assuming the user has an account, PKIGate checks the address book for
recipient preferences, and, if none are found, checks the overall account preferences to
determine if the message should be signed. If either of the above cases holds true, the
user’s private key, either default or preference specified, and the message is sent via a
private connection to Crypto Server, the only location where the private key is decrypted.
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The output of the signing operation is returned to PKIGate where it is formatted by the
S/MIME Freeware Library, wrapped in MIME headers, and returned to the mail server
for sending. If neither the recipient nor the account preferences are set for signing, the
message is returned to the mail server unaltered for sending.
Figure 5.2: The path of a Secure Level Signed Message
Dashed arrows and boxes represent possibly insecure connections or components.
5.3.2 Verify
A user at the secure level allows the Security Manager to automatically verify her
incoming messages. Assuming an account exists, PKIGate checks incoming email.  The
message MIME headers are parsed for information on which, if any, operations were
performed on the email and, if the message was signed, PKIGate obtains the signer’s
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signed content and returns a string representing the success or failure of the operation.
After verification, a content-description header stating whether or not verification was
successful is added to the message.
Figure 5.3: The path of a Secure Level Message Verification.
Dashed arrows and boxes represent possibly insecure connections or
components.
5.3.3 Encrypt
Encrypt works in a similar manner to sign. The user creates an email message in her
regular client. The mail server forwards the relevant information to PKIGate, which
checks the recipient followed by the account preferences and, if warranted, sends a
request consisting of a content encryption key (CEK) and the content to Crypto Server.
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the recipient’s public key, wraps the key and message in MIME headers, and returns it to
the mail server for sending.
5.3.4 Decrypt
A user at the secure level allows PKIGate to automatically decrypt her incoming
messages. PKIGate parses the incoming message headers for information on what, if any,
cryptographic operations were performed. If the message was encrypted, a request
containing the user’s encrypted private key and the content encryption key (CEK) is sent
to the Crypto Server via a private connection.  The user’s private key can only be
decrypted inside the Crypto Server using its host coprocessor’s private key. After the
Crypto Server returns the decrypted CEK, a second request is issued with the decrypted
key and the encrypted content. The Crypto Server returns the decrypted text as part of the
crypt_response object. After PKIGate adds a content-description header noting the
decryption operation performed, the message is returned to the mail server.
5.4 Paranoid
A user at the paranoid level has registered for an account with PKIGate and set a
preference noting she wishes to have as much control over her email as possible. Like
users at the secure level, he has the option of setting account and address book
preferences. However, she also has the added advantage of being able to see and verify
all of the messages PKIGate sends out using her key pairs.
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In exchange for the ability to hide her secure messages from the email administrator, the
paranoid level user surrenders the ability to view decrypted messages or compose
message to be encrypted with her own email client. Instead, in order to guarantee the
security of her messages, the user must type or paste these messages directly in to the
Security Manager window. To have a copy of the message, we suggest the user add
herself as a recipient. Encrypted messages may only be viewed decrypted in the Security
Manager window; they are stored encrypted on the mail server.













We feel the gains for a paranoid level user are well worth the additional effort she
must put in to send or view encrypted messages. In addition to being able to hide
messages from adversaries on the outside of the user’s mail system, the paranoid user can
also hide messages from the email administrator and any other parties snooping within
her mail system. The user does not need to trust anyone involved in the email service and
can assume that if her messages are sent to the correct recipient, only the intended reader
will be able to view the plaintext message.
5.4.1 Sign
To add a signature, the user creates a message using her regular email client. The mail
server contacts PKIGate, and if account or recipient preferences are set to sign the
message, the text of the message, the recipient, and identifying information for the key
used in signing are displayed in the Security Manager Window. There, the user has the
option of making any changes to the content or to the key pair being used before
verifying that she really wishes to send it. If the user consents to send, PKIGate issues a
request to the Crypto Server containing the user’s encrypted private key and the content
to be signed. Crypto Server returns the output of the operation to PKIGate, where it is
wrapped in MIME headers and sent. Otherwise, the user cancels the entire message.
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Figure 5.7: Signing a message at the Paranoid Level
Dashed arrows and boxes represent possibly insecure connections or components.
5.4.2 Verify
A user at the paranoid level allows the Security Manager to automatically verify her
incoming messages. The mail server shunts the incoming message to PKIGate, and, if the
user has an account, MIME headers are parsed for information on which, if any,
operations were performed on the email. If the message has been signed, PKIGate obtains
the signer’s information and sends a request to the Crypto Server on the 4758 over a
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comparison. The Crypto Server verifies the signed content and returns a string
representing the success or failure of the operation. After verification, PKIGate adds a
content-description header to the message stating whether or not verification was
successful.
5.4.3 Encrypt
The encryption case for a user at the paranoid level is difficult to implement both
securely and conveniently. A user at this security level does not want the email
administrator to have access to the unencrypted content of her messages. However, if a
message passes through the client to the regular mail server, it will exist unencrypted on
the server. Given the difficulty of this case, especially since at this point the user is not
required to change her email client, it makes sense to have the user type or paste her
message directly into the Security Manager window. We realize that this is inconvenient,
and leave a better solution to future work.
To send an encrypted message, the a user opens the Security Manager window, selects
“Encrypt” from the list of tasks, and types or pastes the message directly into the trusted
window. The message passes via an SSL connection directly to PKIGate. There, a request
containing the content to be encrypted and the content encryption key (CEK), produced
previously by Crypto Server, is created and sent to the Crypto Server over a private
connection. The server returns the output of the encryption operation to PKIGate, which
sends a second request, this time for encryption of the CEK. PKIGate creates a message
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with the encrypted content and encrypted CEK, wraps it in MIME headers, and returns it
to the mail server for sending.
Figure 5.9: Encrypting a message at the Paranoid Level. Dashed arrows and boxes
represent applications and connections for which we cannot guarantee security.
5.4.4 Decrypt
Decrypting messages is another area in which the paranoid user must make sacrifices
for her desire for security. The message cannot reside on the mail server unencrypted,
therefore it must not be allowed to pass out of PKIGate in its decrypted state. Instead,
when a user is not logged in, the messages go to the mail server encrypted. When the user
logs in to their regular mail client, the messages will appear encrypted. To decrypt them,
the user must log into the Security Manager window, thereby creating a direct secure









2. Send text/CEK in encrypt
request
3. Send CEK, recipient.


















in her account from which she may select a message to decrypt and view. The message is
ONLY decrypted on the screen; it remains unaltered on the mail server.
To decrypt the text, PKIGate sends a request with the encrypted content encryption key
(CEK) and the user’s encrypted private key to the Crypto Server. The private key is
ONLY decrypted inside the Crypto Server by using the host 4758’s private key. The
server decrypts the CEK and returns it. Another request with the encrypted content and
the decrypted content encryption key are sent to the Crypto Server, which decrypts the
message and returns the output to PKIGate. The decrypted text is displayed in the
Security Manager window. In the case of an attachment, PKIGate provides a link to
another browser window where the attachment may be viewed.
Figure 5.9: Decrypting a message at the Paranoid Level. Dashed arrows and boxes
represent applications and connections for which we cannot guarantee security.
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6. Implementation and Conclusions
This section describes difficulties experienced in the process of implementing PKIGate
that prevented us from completing a prototype and suggests future work and user studies
in the S/MIME gateway application area. We conclude by evaluating the success of
PKIGate with respect to our goals for the project and suggesting a new path to victory in
creating a mobile S/MIME solution.
6.1 Implementation Difficulties
The implementation of PKIGate was plagued by several difficulties, preventing us from
creating the desired prototype implementation. The most major of those difficulties, a
suggested solution, and an outline for applicable future work follow.
6.1.1 PKIGate Size or “So, how big is it?”
The design for PKIGate calls for the S/MIME functionality as well the cryptographic
operations to reside on the IBM 4758 secure coprocessor. However, the 4758 imposed a
size restriction on the executable of about 1.8M.
To get an accurate size estimate before writing to the card, we coded an application
representing the SFL object construction and library calls PKIGate would have to make
to offer both authentication and encryption services. We compiled and statically linked
the above executable with all the required libraries using G++3.2.2. Since the libraries
(including the ESNACC 1.4 distribution) were created with G++3.0 in mind, and the
compiler is known to have issues, some of which arose in coding other parts of the
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system, we were forced to apply patches from a newer release that corrected the issues
with our compiler, version 3.2.2. (All steps taken to make the release compile correctly
were documented and are available upon request). The Unix strip utility, which removes
all unnecessary information from the executable, brought the total size of the executable
to 4.8M, larger than the space available on the 4758.
To further reduce the size of the application, we mounted the uClibc (micro-c-libc) file
system. Uclibc is a smaller version of the standard C library used in developing
embedded Linux systems [18]. The file system contains a version of the GCC distribution
and standard libraries that were compiled with the uClibc set of libraries instead of with
the standard versions, reducing their size. Compiling with uClibc G++3.2.2 reduced the
size to 3.9M, almost a 1M difference, but still not small enough to fit on the card.
Bob Colestock, the S/MIME Freeware Library point of contact, suggested in an email
message earlier this term that it would be possible to remove the Cryptographic Token
Interface Library component of the S/MIME Freeware Libraries and plug our
cryptography directly into the application. We hope this will allow the final reduction in
size required to fit PKIGate inside the 4758, and make it possible to combine Crypto
Server and the S/MIME application, therefore removing an unnecessary line of
communication in the system. It is also possible that IBM will release a 4758 secure
coprocessor with more memory space for executables. We leave moving the PKIGate
executable to a secure coprocessor for future work.
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6.2 Implemented Parts
In spite of time consuming difficulties, portions of PKIGate were implemented. The XDR
encoding and communication to be used between PKIGate and Crypto Server has been
coded and tested to work over a regular socket connection (thanks to Alex Iliev and his
previous work with the technology). Additionally, the crypt_request and
crypt_response structures described in Section 4 are implemented and there is an
outline of the PKIGate Account class and necessary calls for S/MIME formatting, used
in attaining an executable size.
6.3 Future Work
We see several areas for future work in addition to the implementation of a full prototype
from the design and the move of PKIGate to a secure coprocessor, as described in
Section 6.1.1.
First, as previously stated, we suggest finding a better way to implement a paranoid
user’s encryption and decryption operations. The current system forces the paranoid user
to use the Security Manager Window as an email client when sending or viewing
encrypted messages and does not provide her with a way to securely save plaintext
messages.
The above ties into an idea for another set of user studies that should be conducted before
a final implementation of PKIGate is released. As Jon Callas notes in “Improving
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Message Security with a Self-Assembling PKI,” PKI will only work if people use it, and
people will only use it if it is as easy to use as the insecure alternative [3].  We suggest
presenting the prototype and alternatives to users who would operate at both the secure
and paranoid levels.
Finally, PKIGate is not a fully operational email client. Eventually, there will come a
time when users are willing to switch to a new email client in exchange for a higher level
of security. This calls for the design of a new trusted Web-based client. Evan Knop’s
paper “Secure Public-Key Services for Web-Based Mail” suggests a method by which the
4758 secure coprocessor can serve its own, trusted content to a client, creating a trusted
environment for S/MIME email [11].
6.4 Conclusions
The PKIGate design meets the goals we laid out in the introduction for a mobile S/MIME
solution at Dartmouth. The system:
1) Gives users a mobile solution. Since a user’s key pair is stored on a central
server, he/she has access to it for cryptographic purposes anywhere at
anytime.
2) Supplies a trusted environment. It utilizes the IBM 4758 secure coprocessor as
the location for all cryptographic operations.
3) Allows users to retain their original email client. PKIGate operates in
conjunction with the mail server without any changes to the email client.
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Given the importance of correct use cases, interfaces, and S/MIME formatting to
PKIGate and the difficulty of installing executables on the 4758, I suggest future work
follow a different research path than the one we took. It would perhaps make more sense
to implement an insecure version of the application on the Blitzmail system or in
conjunction with one of the Web-based email clients, and allow users to test the system
first. To take the study one step further, the application’s underlying cryptography could
be replaced with a temporary stand-in set of functions, such as from the Crypto++ library,
before moving it to a secure hardware platform.
In conclusion, through this thesis I learned many lessons about the design of a large-scale
project. Namely, there will always be more than one good way to design the initial
incarnation of any new application and it is vital to conduct background research, talk to
groups of “real” users, and synthesize the many ideas presented carefully.  A better
design will result from better research and from having to justify one’s design decisions
than from simply deciding on a design path. With this in mind, I suggest to anyone
undertaking this project in the future to familiarize themselves not only with the ideas and
technologies presented in this paper, but also conduct to their own research of new
technologies and with new users.
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